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“Silence! Peace in Progress”: The 2013 Election and Peaceful
Post-Election Dispute Management in Kenya
Akanmu G. Adebayo and Muthoni K. Richards
Kennesaw State University
On March 4, 2013, Kenyans went to the polls to elect the president, vice-president, senators, county
governors, and members of parliament. Tension was high; fears and uncertainties gripped the nation, and
the international community watched with keen interest. Five years earlier, on December 27, 2007, a similar
event had resulted in a horrific post-election violence (PEV) that left thousands dead and hundreds of
thousands displaced, and that disrupted the economic and social conditions of the country and the entire
sub-region. As the 2013 elections approached, the fear became palpable that there might be a recurrence.
Those fears were unrealized; Kenya had an election that the Commonwealth Observer Group, among other
observers, reported to be “credible” and to have met “many of the benchmarks for democratic elections to
which Kenya is committed.” Based on a series of interviews conducted in Kenya in June-December 2013,
this paper evaluates the factors that contributed to preservation of electoral and post-election peace (PEP)
in Kenya.
Keywords: Uhuru Kenyatta, election, Kibaki, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC),
post-election violence, International Criminal Court (ICC), Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)

INTRODUCTION
Kenya didn’t have a perfect election in 2013. In fact,
there is no such thing as a perfect election in Africa—
or anywhere for that matter. But Kenya’s postelection dispute management in 2013 was markedly
different from the previous election. It was deliberate
and decisive. Although the two weeks of widely
televised Supreme Court proceedings over the
election petitions were tension-filled, the process
prevented mass violence as the petitioners accepted
the Court’s ruling as final. This paper examines the
factors that promoted a peaceful resolution of the
disputes over the presidential election in 2013. These

factors are numerous and multifaceted. They
included peace activism by government and ordinary
citizens; the horrifying memory of the recent postelection violence of 2007-2008; and the pressure of
the international community, including the shadow
of the International Criminal Court.
Other factors were the increased confidence in
the electoral management body, the Independent
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC); the
performance of security agents in managing tensions
in the period leading to the 2013 general election;
and the adoption of a new constitution which,
through devolution, shifted some of the powers
hitherto concentrated in the central government to
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the Counties. Still other factors were the vibrant
social media which absorbed most of the irreverent,
inflammatory statements shocks, as disputes that
ordinarily would have been vexed on the streets were
taken online; the civil society organizations and
opinion leaders that worked hard to educate and
mobilize the citizenry towards a more peaceful
conflict resolution; and the increased confidence in
the Supreme Court, especially in the newly
appointed justices. The paper looks closely at several
of these factors and draws lessons for post-election
dispute management in similar African countries.
Relying mostly on interviews conducted between
June and December 2013, the paper presents
Kenyans’ thoughts and reflections about the
country’s efforts in 2013 to hold its general elections
and manage the results with minimal violence.
Methodologically, the authors combine specific
approaches from history and social sciences
disciplines. The authors review and examine
government and political party publications, selected
civil society records, independent commission
reports, and citizens’ opinions published in
newspapers and social media for their historical
information relevant to the subject. They also review
the existing literature to inform and validate this
study’s findings. In addition, they conduct oral
interviews and focus group discussion. The research
design took the form of semi-structured interviews;
the bulk of these interviews were conducted in
Nairobi in June 2013,1 and the last one in
Washington D.C. in December 2013. A purposive
sample of participants was generated by referral. A
total of fifteen participants were interviewed. In
addition, a focus group discussion (FGD) was held at
the Africa Leadership Center in Nairobi. The
location of interviews ranged from participants’
offices and homes to hotel lobbies and an airport gate
(as the participant was traveling out of the country).
These hour-long interviews (by average) were
transcribed and, subsequently, analyzed for common
and dominant themes and responses. Participants
were given pseudonyms; Table 1 presents a list of
participants by pseudonyms.
The small sample size is a major limitation of the
study. However, since the study is exploratory and

hypothesis-generating, the interviews do not
constitute the main source of information. Moreover,
in evidence from oral interviews and focus group
discussion are triangulates with evidence from the
literature and published sources. The result is a truly
robust exploration of the factors that promoted the
experience of post-electoral peace in Kenya in 2013.
Table 1: List of Participants
Code Name
in Study
Timothy

Date
Interviewed
6/27/2013

George

6/21/2013

Najib

12/16/2013

Pius

6/20/2013

Sarah

6/20/2013

Aaron

6/26/2013

Joshua

6/21/2013

Moses

6/21/2013

Naomi

6/24/2013

Isaiah

6/21/2013

Barnabas

6/20/2013

Mwendwa

6/25/2013

Martha

6/25/2013

Peter

6/24/2013

Luke

6/24/2013
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Brief Biography
Scholar, contestant in 2007
election
Journalist, writer for
newspapers and social
media
Top-ranking IEBC official
Pastor of a leading, nondenominational church in
Nairobi
Presidential candidate in
2013 election
Scholar, pastor, leader in
Christian Council of Kenya
Chairman of a commission
established in 2008 by the
government to promote
peace and co-existence
Kenya’s influential
ambassador
Attorney, head of civil
society that champions
constitutional rights, law,
and justice in East Africa
Scholar, head of a major
leadership training center
Renowned artist, peace
activist
Top-ranking IEBC official
Attorney, head of civil
society that champions
transparency, governance,
and electoral credibility
Presidential candidate in
2013 election
Renowned musician, peace
activist

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
The unholy connection between elections and
conflict in Africa has been the subject of numerous
studies. The most relevant to the theme of this study
are those that explore issues related to the 2007-2008
PEV in Kenya. Perhaps the best place to start is
Andrew Reynold’s 2009 article entitled “Elections,
Electoral Systems, and Conflict in Africa.”2
Published a year after Kenya’s PEV, the article
opines that elections are “not only transition points;
they are repeatable moments that become critical to
democratic development.”3 Reynolds argues that
electoral systems are a significant reason why there
is conflict in Africa. By his definition, electoral
systems are how votes that are cast translate into
seats.
The system also has the ability to create space for
election frauds but can limit malfeasance. If there are
no limits on the power of the winner of an election,
Reynolds states, then elections themselves become a
matter of life and death. In addition, post-election
conflicts have often led to a peace settlement that
sometimes includes power sharing—making the
election seem unnecessary in the first place. If power
sharing arrangement requires inclusion of minority
and majority groups, then an electoral system might
be designed to allow proportional representation.
Reynolds proposes the Elklit-Reynolds Election
Quality Assessment4 framework which measures the
quality of an election. The resulting score (out of
100) tells how high the administrative quality and
institutional legitimacy of an election are. In Kenya’s
case, the 2007 election scored 51, signaling an
ineffective electoral system.
A much more Kenya-specific review of elections
and conflict is the article by Marcel Rutten and Sam
Owuor, appropriately entitled “Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Land, Ethnicity and the 2007 Elections
in Kenya.”5 In this paper, Rutten and Owour discuss
the origins of conflict in Kenya, specifically conflict
that occurs during election cycles. Land is identified
as the main cause of conflicts, including land
alienation from the colonial period, unfair land
reallocation practices since independence, increased
land pressure caused by the alienation, droughts and

famine as well as the attempts to forcibly remove
those ethnicities that are deemed interlopers. Rutten
and Owuor further set the historical context, which
they date to the late 1800s, to the early intra-ethnic
conflicts of the Nilotic groups such as the Turkana,
Samburu, Oromo and Maasai. In the postindependence era, the land commission that was
charged with the reallocation of White Settler lands
did not return lands to the original communities;
rather, the land was sold to the wealthy who were
mostly Kikuyu. President Jomo Kenyatta himself
took large parcels and awarded others to his closest
friends and supporters. Dissatisfied communities
later decided to take their ancestral lands back,
evidenced in land clashes in 1993-1997 during the
Moi era. In the view of Rutten and Owuor, on the
surface the political parties were established based
on ethnic cleavages; below the surface, however,
many ethnic parties were also formed along land
issues.6 These cleavages were also represented
ideologically, for example, by Jaramogi Odinga
urging his supporters not to pay for the land since it
was theirs previously.
If, indeed, the media constitutes the political
watchdog, how was the 2008 PEV covered? In their
article entitled “Newspaper Coverage of Post
Political Election Violence in Africa: An Assessment
of the Kenyan Example,”7 Uche Onyebadi and Tayo
Oyedeji provided some answers. The authors
identify the main newspapers in Kenya: the Daily
Nation and the East African Standard. By reviewing
the types of stories the two main newspapers carried,
the authors show that in the period running up to the
election (October to November 2007), the largest
percentage of front page news was on the election
campaigns; there was none regarding conflict or the
anticipation of conflict. From January 2008 (postelection period), front page stories consisted of 50%
peace meetings and only 3% were about violence.
Segmenting further for individual publications, in the
pre-election period, the Nation carried 20 stories
while the Standard carried 32 stories. In the postelection period, the Nation carried 6 stories on peace
meetings and 4 on violence while the Standard
carried 23 stories on peace meetings and none (zero)
on violence. This indicates that, unlike the Rwandan
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case where the media was seen to have driven
violence, in Kenya the newspapers seemed to have
“become vehicles for the propagation of peace in a
troubled nation.”8 The authors also make the case for
“peace journalism” which they described as
journalism that is “oriented toward peace, truth,
people and solutions to conflicts.”9 This is contrasted
to “war journalism” which tends to report violence
and its “attendant destruction.”10
A recurring subject in Kenyan and African PEV
is the issue of impunity. After the 2008 PEV, one
might ask, how many people have been tried, found
guilty of major crimes against humanity, and
punished? How many have been brought to justice?
In the article provocatively entitled “The Big Fish
Won’t Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for
Post-Election Violence in Kenya,” Stephen Brown
and Sandra Sriram discuss the reasons why Kenya
has failed to bring about justice after post-election
violence since the 1990s. They argue that Kenya’s
efforts to transition politically have been stifled by
the fact that those in power during the single party
era are still in power now. These same individuals,
the “big fish,” have been implicated in various
commission reports (Akiwumi in 1992 and Waki in
2008) but they have been able to exert their influence
and have frustrated any actions to bring them to
justice. The same was true after the 2007/2008
election, but the Waki Commission was able to stem
their influence by building in their report a selfenforcement mechanism that resulted in the Kenyan
case being referred to the ICC. Brown and Sriram
explain this self-enforcement mechanism as follows:
To pressure the government to adopt this
recommendation, the Commission’s report contained
an ingenious self-enforcing mechanism: if the
government did not create the tribunal, the
Commission’s chair would pass on evidence to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and request that it
become involved. Soon after the report was published,
the government committed itself to the
implementation of the report’s recommendations,
including the creation of the Special Tribunal. The
government never set up the tribunal, however. Efforts
to present and pass a bill in Parliament failed on three
separate occasions and have since been abandoned.
Instead, the government regularly promised

prosecutions in the national courts, but the likelihood
of that actually taking place seems remote. 11

Because of this issue of impunity and injustices
that have piled up over the years, perhaps the 20072008 violence was inevitable. Brown and Sriram
argue that were it not for the “shadow of the ICC”
then any attempts to have a hybrid tribunal
established would not have materialized. The
previous lack of accountability for those who
perpetrated pre- and post-election violence had
created an atmosphere of impunity that the ICC was
attempting to break. They also argue that there has
been a paradigm shift in the judicial and political
action as well as the conversations that were sparked
by the ICC’s involvement. For example, this has
helped to create an independent judiciary and several
actions taken by this new judiciary have helped build
public trust.
To close out this literature review, it is important
to note that Kenya has held elections regularly, every
five years, since 1962. Nevertheless, Kenya is not
considered to have achieved “democratic
consolidation.” Admittedly, the elections held in the
single-party era of authoritarianism and dictatorship
did not count. Like many other countries in the
region, multiparty democratic transitions began in
the 1990s, but the elections have provoked violence,
the 2007-2008 PEV being the most pugnacious. The
literature on democratic consolidation is vast,12
especially since the concept is usually applied
globally.13 While all the indices of “consolidation”
are still debated, peaceful, free and fair, and credible
elections have been considered major ingredients. As
developing countries began to emerge from
authoritarian system in the 1990s, it became essential
to differentiate “uncertain” from “certain”
democracies. But, according to Steven Friedman, the
democratic consolidation paradigm is “vague,
teleological and ethnocentric and measures new
democracies against an idealised understanding of
Northern liberal democracies.”14 In essence, and as
will be revealed in this paper, even with its fifty-year
experience of elections Kenya is not counted among
“consolidated,” “certain” democracies partly
because of the history of post-electoral violence and
the dearth of democratic institutions, and partly
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because political power has merely circulated among
the same group of political elite.15

KENYA’S 2013 GENERAL ELECTIONS:
HOW UHURU KENYATTA BECAME PRESIDENT
It was months after the 2013 elections before the
IEBC released the final poll results, causing great
discomfort among Kenya’s political elites. When the
figures were eventually presented to Parliament,
IEBC officials—Chairman Isack Hassan and CEO
James Oswago—refused to take the oath.16 The
released figures claimed that the total votes cast in
the presidential election were 12,330,028 of which
12, 221,053 were valid; of these valid votes,
Kenyatta received 6,173,433 and Raila 5,340,546,
the difference being 832,887 votes. The IEBC also
established that “Kenyatta crossed the constitutional
threshold of 50 percent plus one with just over 4,000
votes.”17
How then did Uhuru Kenyatta become elected
president of Kenya in 2013? What were the
implications of his election for the sustenance of
post-electoral peace in Kenya? We posit that the
election of Uhuru Kenyatta and the achievement of
post-electoral peace in Kenya are interrelated.
However, this is not to suggest that there would have
been violence if Kenyatta were not declared winner.
Rather, it is to argue that the combination of factors
in the period leading up to the election predict and
assure peaceful transition. Several of these factors
will be presented and discussed in this paper. Of
these, the most important factor for the election of
Uhuru Kenyatta was the formation of a winning
coalition, the Jubilee Alliance, by Kikuyu and
Kalenjin leaders, placing Uhuru Kenyatta and
(Kikuyu) and Ruto (Kalenjin) on the same ticket.
The formation of what came to be called the
Jubilee Alliance followed the pattern of limitedpurpose politico-ethnic alliance which had
characterized Kenya’s electoral history. However,
the Jubilee Alliance was unique in a number of
ways—and it was almost unexpected. Under its
umbrella, the two ethnic groups that were at the
center of the 2007-08 PEV, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin,
came together.

In the 2007 elections, the Kalenjin were pitted
against the Kikuyu in the parties and coalitions.
Kibaki’s political party, the Party of National Unity
(PNU), was composed of majority Kikuyu while the
main opposition party, the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM), was a mix of ethnicities from
Western Kenya, of which the Kalenjin is a part. In
2007, it was believed, the Kalenjin were seeking to
remove the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley. On
December 29, 2007, the Electoral Commission of
Kenya (ECK) declared Kibaki winner, and he was
sworn in shortly thereafter at midnight. The pent-up
anger mixed with emotions that the votes had been
stolen, and violence irrupted immediately.
In the new Jubilee Coalition, Uhuru Kenyatta and
William Ruto were nominated to contest for the
positions of President and Deputy President
respectively, positions that they now occupy at the
time of writing. By joining forces, not only did they
ensure a win, but this coalition also forced the two
groups to come together in a show of unity. This can
be argued to be a major cause of the subsequent
relatively peaceful elections and the peaceful
handling of the post-election petitions. The question
is: How long would this alliance last, especially if the
underlying ethnic and land issues remain
unaddressed?

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR POST-ELECTION
PEACE IN 2013
A good place to start this evaluation of Kenya’s
peaceful post-election dispute management is the
election management body (EMB) itself.18
Established in accordance with the new constitution
of 2010, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC) was created in part because of
the failure of the Interim Independent Electoral
Commission of Kenya (IIEC) which had
administered the previous election. The IIEC proved
to be corruptible, and the manner in which it released
the election results of 2007 was the immediate cause
of the outbreak of violence. Prior to the general
election of 2013 the new EMB, the IEBC, was able
to prove itself to the public by administering several
by-elections. The successful manner in which these

Peace and Conflict Management Working Papers Series

Page 5

by-elections were conducted created a sense of
confidence towards the IEBC regarding its ability
and fairness. As stated by Najib, a high-ranking
official of the IEBC, “more than 86% of Kenyans had
full confidence in the Commission [and that it] would
conduct free and fair elections.”
Nevertheless, the IEBC was faced with enormous
challenges. One of these was the requirement to
register more than 14 million voters within 30 days.
This required technology that the IEBC did not have
at the time. The IEBC had to acquire this technology
in short order through a process that turned out to be
flawed. In the end, an intervention by former
President Kibaki and former Prime Minister Odinga
secured the necessary technology through a
“Canadian government loan in the amount of $68.1
million.”19
The IEBC’s tasks also included the registration
of political parties as mandated by the Kenyan
constitution20 and the Elections Act of 2011. This act
sets forth all regulations pertaining to the running of
an election from the methods by which the county
returning officers were appointed to the means by
which pre-election disputes are to be resolved.
Considering the magnitude of the task ahead, the
IEBC worked closely with assistance from the
International Foundation of Electoral Systems. The
process required the registration of 59 political
parties and millions of voters based on the Political
Parties Act of 2011.21 To streamline this otherwise
laborious process, the IEBC empowered political
parties to enter the necessary data on their own.
However, decentralizing this process did cause some
concerns because some political parties were
accused of falsifying their member rosters to meet
the requirements. There were numerous incidents of
Kenyans being registered without their knowledge
which led to the generation of the hash tag
#FakePartyMembersKe as a means of bringing
attention to the matter. There was also the allegation
that members were transferred from one party to
another.22 To address these concerns, the IEBC
created an online platform where voters were able to
verify the parties with which they were registered.
Also, the IEBC created an email address where
complaints regarding this and related matters could

be lodged. Finally, the IEBC placed a warning on its
website that “it is an offense punishable by law for
any political party to register a member without his
or her knowledge. Any party doing so could be
deregistered and penalized.”23
The IEBC worked hard to ensure impartiality in
all its operations, especially at the grassroots level.
The Carter Center, one of the international observer
groups, lauded the IEBC for its transparency. In its
preliminary report issued shortly after the election,
the Carter Center finds “that Kenya’s polls were
well-conducted in a peaceful environment. Voter
turnout appears to have been high. The Independent
Electoral and Boundaries Commission has made
important commitments to improve the transparency
of the counting and tabulation of votes.”24 Also,
according to Najib, IEBC officials made every effort
to remain impartial and professional to the extent that
they did not vote in the election. The IEBC employed
returning officers who were trained in the rules and
regulations pertaining to the tasks they would be
carrying out. Furthermore, to ensure impartiality, the
IEBC did not post any returning officers to their
home districts or original location of their ethnicity.
The officers and clerks were also trained in
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to act on
behalf of the IEBC. These officers were empowered
to report any circumstances that could likely lead to
armed conflict.
Many organizations joined in the IEBC’s efforts
to mitigate conflict. These include the Kenya Human
Rights Commission and the National Cohesion and
Integration Commission whose aim is to “facilitate
and promote a Kenyan society whose values are
harmonious and non-discriminatory for a peaceful
co-existence and integration.”25 Together they were
able to establish a text message hotline where
inflammatory speeches could be reported
anonymously. Monitoring hate speech is crucial.
Hate speech was identified as a primary means of
inciting armed conflict in the 2007 election
campaign. In addition, there were senior Deputy
Police Commissioners who were attached to the
IEBC which facilitated quicker responses to reports
of conflict or potential conflict. Peace committees
were established both at the county and national
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levels, and their function was to facilitate forums at
which political parties and the IEBC could discuss
concerns that could lead to conflict. The committees
at the county level were headed by a village
headman, a designation that likely gave them a sense
of legitimacy in the communities.
Another challenge that the IEBC faced was in the
management of expectations.26 One of those
expectations was that the results of presidential vote
would be available soon after all polling stations
were closed and that all results would be transmitted
electronically. The latter was of great significance
since Kenya has a history of electoral irregularities.
A major source of post-election violence was the
claim that the election had been stolen by means of
rigging, ballot stuffing, number swapping, and other
irregularities. Having the ability to report polling
station results directly and electronically provided a
secure and timely means with which the IEBC could
wrap up the process. However, several errors
occurred on the day of election, including the
malfunctioning of voting machines, and the failure to
transmit the results electronically as initially
planned. Many polling stations had to revert to the
manual voter lists as well as manual casting of
ballots. Consequently, the provisional results did not
arrive as expected. Instead, the returning officers had
to travel to the central tallying location late at night
with the paper results. The resultant delay heightened
tension and promoted mistrust of the IEBC.27
Despite these imperfections in the conduct of the
election by the IEBC, Kenyans have largely accepted
the results and have chosen the paths of peaceful
resolution rather than violence. What was
responsible for the relatively peaceful election and
non-violent handling of post-election disputes in
2013? Thematic analysis of the interviews reveals six
major factors. These factors were not ranked but
respondents identified them very frequently. They
were:







recent memory of post-election violence;
several years of peace activism;
the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
(TJRC);
the shadow of the International Criminal Court (ICC);
the new constitution; and
the Supreme Court

Recent Memory of Post-Election Violence
A major explanation for the peaceful post-election
dispute handling in 2013 was the horror of the
immediate past post-election violence. Several
interviewees expressed the desire to never see or
experience another PEV. This “never again!” attitude
was shared by many Kenyans. Peter stated that there
were intentional actions taken to ensure that violence
of the 2007-08 scale never broke out again. Some of
these initiatives were government-sponsored, others
were sponsored by individuals and faith groups.
Najib expatiated thus:
Kenyans had learned a lesson from 2007/2008. I think
there was that “collective will” you can say by the
nation that never again will we go back to the brink of
civil war. And so it became a civic duty of everybody,
whether you are a small person, you are a community
leader, you are a Pastor, you are an Imam, you are a
political leader, a professional society, media;
everybody took it upon themselves to make sure that
this time around we don’t go back to where we came
from in 2007/2008.28

Several Years of Peace Activism
Following the violent outcome of the 2007 elections,
there was a proliferation of peace activism. Naomi
gave extensive information on the work done by her
organization and several others. These organizations
mobilized the populace for peace. Some were
secular, others were religious; some efforts were
promoted by the government, others by the civil
society. Many efforts—from religious sermons to
speeches, from music to art, from parental caution to
friendly commentaries on Facebook—were geared
toward peace. A few individual and group efforts
deserve mention.
Luke stated that individuals were significant in
the process of civic education and selling the
message of peace alongside the various
organizations. Many individuals took on the cause of
peace activism. A good example was Eric Wainaina,
whose song “Daima Kenya” was played repeatedly
on the radio and television to preach the message of
peace. There were other avenues used like a musical
released by Eric Wainaina that criticized the issues
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of ethnicity and how politicians have used this to
divide and conquer. There was also a concert that
was out together with the support of the Kenya Red
Cross, called “Chagua Peace” (Choose Peace). The
idea was for all who attended to come in shirts that
showed the party they supported. This was intended
to show that regardless of the party one supported,
being Kenyan was greater than the election and the
tensions that have come with it. Another individual
effort was by Boniface Mwangi whose photographic
depictions of what happened in 2007-08 were a part
of civic education and sensitization. For the purposes
of ensuring a wider reach and to educate the public
on civic matters, peace activists used the radio and
local theaters. Radio DJs used their art to promote
peace education especially targeting the youths and
other important segments of their audience. In
addition to promoting peace, these media educated
the populace about the duty of the electorate, the role
of government, and what the electorate should expect
of their representatives.
In addition to individuals, groups, especially
religious groups, also engaged in peace activism. The
church had been chided for its role in the 2007-08
PEV for failing to engage the public as it should
have. Kenya is 80% Christian. Thus, the church and
its leadership occupy a very powerful position in the
community. As articulated by Naomi, pastors and
bishops are taken seriously by the communities they
lead; their words result in collective action.
It is important to understand that, in 2007-08, the
attackers and those they attacked were churchgoers.
The church was in a precarious position, and it
seemed to have lost its grips on the good
neighborliness of its congregation. On the one hand,
when the violence broke out following the 2007
elections, the churches were places of sanctuary for
those escaping the violence. On the other hand,
individual churches were targets of the perpetrators
of violence; there was the tragedy of the church in
Kiambaa that was burned to the ground with women
and children in it.29 According to Pius, local pastors
and bishops placed urgent calls to their superiors in
Nairobi, requesting assistance due to the
overwhelming numbers of IDPs in their compounds.
As a body, the church rose up to the challenge of

providing immediate humanitarian relief as well as
longer-term soul searching. A bus tour was
organized and it consisted of church leaders and its
qualified lay people. Pius made a specific reference
to their arrival at the grounds of the International
Agricultural Show of Kenya (ISK) in Nakuru and
seeing “a sea of people who were displaced and
living in terrible conditions.”30 He went on to note
that due to the poor public perception of the church
at the time, they opted not to wear their collars or any
other items that may identify them as church leaders.
The fear was that if they were recognized, those they
were attempting to reach would not be willing to
receive them or the help they were bringing. In
general the church was perceived as a moral failure.
These bus tours resulted in the re-establishment
of the church as a legitimate leader in the community
and consequently in the country. Also due to these
continuous outreaches by the church to the displaced,
members of the public were willing to listen when
the church began to address the issues that led to the
armed conflict and began to preach the message of
peace. In 2012, there were reports of churches
hosting political leaders, security officials, and other
community leaders in their services as part of
spreading the message of peace.
Naomi, one of the participants in the study, works
for an organization that came into being at the behest
of church leaders. The interviewee stated that, as a
lawyer and an active church member, it became
apparent that the church needed those in the legal
profession to assist in presenting its case to the
government and the public. The organization has
been responsible for numerous training programs
especially in the locations where the violence was at
its worst in 2007-08. As a non-church body but one
made up of Christians, they were able to voice
opinions and carry messages on behalf of the church
but from a legal perspective.
The pursuit of peace in the period before the 2013
election covered the issue of hate speech. One of the
major concerns was about hate speech and the media.
George, a journalist and a participant in this study,
stated that journalists were extremely cautious in
how they reported any stories, news, or anything to
do with the election. He further stated that journalists
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were required to take sensitivity training so they
would be aware of how others might interpret the
news and reports being delivered via any media
outlets. Isaiah, one of the participants in this study,
commented on this self-censorship of the media and
labelled the situation “Silence! Peace in progress.” In
his opinion, peace trumped truth and justice.
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
(TJRC)
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
was established for the express purposes of giving
Kenyans the space to air the injustices done to them
by the Government, government officials or with the
complicity of the authorities. Its final report was
published in May 2013 after more than 6 years of
gathering information from Kenyans across the
country. The commission was established to promote
peace, justice, national unity, healing, reconciliation
and dignity among the people of Kenya.
Ordinary Kenyans testified of injustices
committed against them regardless of who was
implicated. Victims of PEV felt that the Kenyan
government was finally listening to them. According
to Moses, there were expressions of relief by people
who came to testify before the TJRC:
There were some people who came up and spoke with
us after [their testimony]. They [said], “We are
relieved. Thank you.” [We asked], “What do you
want? What would you like the state to do?” They
[replied], “I don’t want anybody to do anything. I have
spoken and for the first time since the last 20, 30 years;
I’ve not had a chance. I am free now. I’m ok. I’m
finished with it.”

This statement indicates the impact of the TJRC
on the peace process. People and communities were
able to testify at the TJRC hearings. Many
interviewees for this study cite the TJRC as a major
factor in the peaceful post-election dispute handling
of 2013. As Moses stated, tensions were also known
to flare up into conflict because those who were
wronged did not feel that they had a means to redress.
With the TJRC providing a place for them to give
voice to their story, they were able to get past it and
to move on with their lives.

Shadow of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
The role of the ICC in Kenya’s politics created a
sense of urgency and was probably a major factor in
the creation of the Jubilee Alliance. This can be
referred to as an unintended consequence of ICC
intervention. As Isaiah described it, the indictment
by the ICC of the presidential candidates on the
Jubilee Alliance ticket for crimes against humanity
“raised the stakes in the election quite a bit . . . the
ICC introduced a dynamic in the electoral process
that in a sense implied that you either run for
elections and win and find a way of dealing with the
ICC or you don’t run and your fate is sealed at The
Hague.” It is arguable that the winning coalition used
the ICC issue as a tool for political mobilization. This
is a sentiment echoed by Isaiah who stated that
“[T]here is a sense in which elections were
interpreted by a segment of society that the
international criminal court case against President
Uhuru and his Deputy William Ruto was designed to
prevent them from exercising their right to run for
office and therefore perhaps even becoming the
President.” Also, according to Sarah, a contestant in
the 2013 election, this pressure was polarizing to the
electorate to the extent that, “there were not many
people willing to discuss the ICC issue.” Still on the
same issue, Luke, one of Kenya’s top musicians and
a peace activist, stated that the public sentiment
could have created the momentum upon which the
Jubilee Alliance’s election campaign was built
because it “galvanized support for them.”
Ironically, the ICC fire has burnt out; there
remains only one active case of the original six—the
case against current Vice President William Ruto.
There is the possibility that the case against President
Uhuru Kenyatta will be dropped due to insufficient
evidence. This current state of affairs may have
inadvertently made the ICC appear illegitimate and
irrelevant since it was initially meant to address those
who were “above the law,” those who could not be
touched by their country’s legal processes because of
the culture of impunity. With the Jubilee Alliance
winning the 2013 election, and the vacillations by the
ICC in its prosecution of President Uhuru Kenyatta,
it seems that the ICC case has lost steam. It appears

Peace and Conflict Management Working Papers Series

Page 9

that, by electing Kenyatta and Ruto, Kenyan voters
had also rendered the ICC powerless.
The New Constitution
All the participants in this study credited the new
constitution with Kenya’s ability to resolve the 2013
post-election
dispute
peacefully.
Several
interviewees discussed the lack of trust that existed,
especially since Kibaki had appointed several judges
to the Supreme Court and high courts right before the
2007 election. The ODM leadership did not feel that
they would have been able to get an impartial and fair
ruling had they gone to court in 2008. So, ODM
supporters opted to take their discontent to the
streets.
The new Constitution not only provided a way
out, it also set time limits on the hearings.
Historically, Kenya’s judicial process has been
tortuously slow. According to Naomi, the new
guidelines set in place were both beneficial but they
also presented a challenge:
The general populace are quiet happy with the
constitution because they imagine(d) that it (was)
going to block things that happened before… Now
many people are starting to open their eyes to the fact
that those things we thought were being solved are
actually not being solved. Take a case in point, what’s
going on with the Senate and the National assembly.
We imagined that by creating an extra chamber of
parliament and that having more people in government
would put some (oversight) on the power of the
President. Yes we have more people but there are no
checks and balances because (of) the way it was
described in the constitution . . . .

justices. The process served as a means to create
transparency and accountability, something that was
missing at the time of the 2007 election. As stated by
Najib, “This new constitution had created . . . a new
judiciary which was now independent with a
Supreme Court and a new Chief Justice. And the
manner of appointment of . . . the judges in the
judiciary was also transparent and open, no longer
just at the preserve of the president. And so the level
of faith and confidence of the people in these
institutions was very high going towards the
elections.” The general public was confident that the
newly established Supreme Court was capable of
handling post-election disputes and petitions with
impartiality and openness and “so the temptation to
go to the streets was reduced extremely.”32 In
addition, several cases had been handled by the new
Supreme Court with outcomes that made it clear that
it was independent of any undue influence. In sharp
contrast to the 2007 elections, the public sentiment
was that the judiciary at the time was not transparent
and was a puppet of the President. In addition, the
2013 post-election dispute proceedings at the
Supreme Court were televised which allowed the
public to see what was happening in the courtroom.
That was the first time this had happened in Kenya
and it served as to boost the public’s confidence
significantly.
In a lecture delivered at the Colloquium for the
Selected Bench of the Judiciary Working Committee
on Election Preparations, held at the Great Rift
Valley Lodge, Naivasha, on April 23, 2013, Hon
Justice J. B. Ojwang, Justice of the Supreme Court of
Kenya, explained the significance of Kenya’s dispute
handling strategy following the 2013 election:

The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was overhauled with the
promulgation of the 2010 Constitution. The
Constitution enumerated the process through which
the judges to the various courts would be selected.31
This was a move that required the input of the
Judicial Service Commission and the National
Assembly.
The appointments to this court were disrupted by
some disputes ranging from the legality of the
appointments to the criteria used to select the

. . . [The] issue regarding election to the Presidential
office relates directly to the question whether the
Kenyan State will be in a position to discharge the vital
functions of the Executive Branch. It means, a dispute
relating to Presidential election is infinitely more
sensitive: as it will affect the country’s standing in
terms of the management of the State’s internal
affairs, and will have a bearing on Kenya’s fulfilment
of her international mandate. At the level of the
Presidency, therefore, there is an exceptional interest
in the integrity and legitimacy of the election, both at
home and abroad.33
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Justice Ojwang went on to say that the Supreme
Court took cognizance of these need for sensitivity
in its hearings and ruling on the Supreme Court
Election Petition No. 5 of 2013. According to him,
Since such electoral disputes will fall at the doors of
the Judiciary, the Courts must not only take judicial
notice of the foregoing realities, but go further and
adopt general guidelines that embody fairness,
practicality and legitimacy, for dealing with the
differing election-dispute scenarios.34

CONCLUSION
As this paper clearly demonstrates, the changeover
from the 2008 post-election violence (PEV) to the
2013 post-election peace (PEP) has been remarkable.
Several questions still remain. The first is the
sustainability of the peace that was exhibited in the
elections of 2013. Will this peace endure for the 2017
and subsequent elections? It can be argued that,
currently, a state of negative peace exists because of
the heavy police presence in the slums, where
violence had been severe in 2008. Will civil society
organizations (CSOs) be able to sustain their peace
programs at the level, scale, and frequency seen in
the 2008-2013 period? According to Barnabas, one
of the participants in this study, Kenyan CSOs are
largely dependent on donor funding which can be
unpredictable. In addition, so far the political elites
have been unwilling to have the tough conversations
that would address historical injustices. For instance,
President Uhuru Kenyatta hails from the very
wealthy Kenyatta family which obtained its wealth
by taking possession of large tracts of resource rich
land. It was not surprising that when the TJRC was
ready to issue its final report in 2013, the report was
edited to exclude these subjects.35 The issue of land
and other historical injustices have since been pushed
to the National Land Commission (NLC) Taskforce
on Historical Land Injustices chaired by Samuel
Tororei.36
Devolution is another issue that may impact the
sustainability of the PEP in the long term. At the time
of writing this paper, there were at least three (3)
county boundary disputes with several deaths
already reported in one dispute.37 These disputes

indicate that the process of devolution is not as
certain as the constitution meant it to be. In addition
to these boundary disputes, members of the CORD
coalition have called for a constitutional referendum
and the disbandment of the IEBC, claiming that the
electoral management body (EMB) botched the 2013
election.38 This means that even though it is being
implemented as envisaged in the constitution,
devolution is not a permanent solution to ethnopolitical crises. One of the issues surrounding the
sustainability of devolution is the current electoral
set up which entails having six elections in one day.
The second, and larger, issue is how expensive
devolution has turned out to be. The National Budget
has currently allocated to the counties an amount of
USD 2.7 billion annually ($1=Ksh 85) which is 15
percent of the budget. However the referendum
(which was in progress at the time of writing)
demanded an increase to 45 percent of the national
budget, costing about $9.5 billion.39 Considering that
Kenya’s budget runs at a deficit of 4.5% of its annual
gross domestic product (2014),40 then implementing
this would present a challenge to the overall
economy.
A long-term question raised and discussed at
great lengths by participants in this study is: What
lessons can the rest of Africa learn from Kenya’s
peaceful handling of its post-election disputes in
2013, just one general election after the post-election
violence of 2008? Several interviewees stressed the
need for independent institutions, especially EMBs.
Incidentally, Najib and Martha are in full agreement
on this issue, despite their opposing views and
backgrounds. Their view and that of others is that one
of the main contributing factors to the post-election
violence in 2008 was the perception that ECK, the
then EMB, was corrupt and that it was in the
“pockets” of the incumbent President Kibaki.
However, the establishment of the IEBC brought
rays of hope; subsequently, the IEBC earned trust
and credibility in the manner it managed the byelections that took place before the general elections.
So far, the IEBC has survived rigorous criticism.
Doing a better job of the 2017 election might not only
promote electoral sustainability, but also forestall
another PEV and reinforce democracy in Kenya.
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Another institution that was cited severally was
the Judiciary. An independent and impartial judiciary
is important to make decisions when election results
are disputed. The Kenyan public was willing to trust
the new, reformed judiciary.
Lastly, while the institution of the Executive had
been fairly stable since independence, it had become
a source of conflict as the location of wealth and
power. Winning the presidency became the goal of
political elites and their backers. Devolving and
redistributing these powers to the counties is
expected to reduce acrimonious competition, the
kind that led to violence in 2008.
This brings us to the final point. In researching
this paper we found through the numerous interviews
and available literature that there is an underlying
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